In this paper, we empirically investigate the impact of the credit risk of Eurozone member countries on the stability of the Euro. In the absence of a common euro bond, euro-area credit risk is induced though the credit default swaps of the member countries. The stability of the euro is examined by decomposing dollar-euro exchange rate options into the moments of the risk-neutral distribution. We document that during the sovereign debt crisis changes in the creditworthiness of member countries have significant impact on the stability of the euro. In particular, an increase in member countries' credit risk results in an increase of volatility of the dollar-euro exchange rate along with soaring tail risk induced through the risk-neutral kurtosis. We find that member countries' credit risk is a major determinant of the euro crash risk as measured by the risk-neutral skewness. We propose a new indicator for currency stability by combining the risk-neutral moments into an aggregated risk measure and show that our results are robust to this change in measure. Noticeable is the fact that during the sovereign debt crisis, the creditworthiness of countries with vulnerable fiscal positions is the main risk-endangering factor of the euro-stability.
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Motivation
In view of the current sovereign debt crisis, understanding the dynamics of the credit risk of the euro-area countries proves urgent so as to prevent dire scenarios. At worst, the default of a major country would unleash the currency break-up, ravage the European banking system and ultimately engender a global economic slump. In this study, we view the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis through the twin lenses of sovereign credit swaps and currency option markets. In the absence of Eurobonds, we empirically examine the impact of the credit risk of member countries on the stability of the Euro.
The credit risk of a country can be measured through its sovereign credit default swap (CDS) 1 .
Market prices of CDS spreads reflect the perception of financial markets about the economicpolitical stability of a country, and thus about the creditworthiness of a given sovereign. As shown by Pan and Singleton (2008) , the changes in credit risk premiums of sovereign markets which translate into changes in sovereign CDS spreads, do not emanate from changes in fundamentals of the underlying economies. Rather, these variations mirror a change in the risk appetite of market participants in terms of credit exposure. A negative change in the creditworthiness of a sovereign inevitably translates into a depreciation of its currency along with soaring currency volatility. Furthermore, currency option prices are instruments which are capable of predicting the changes in the realized volatility of currency returns. Based on data from the Mexican and Brazilian Markets, Car and Wu (2007) establish a relationship between sovereign CDS spreads and currency return volatilities induced through implied-volatilities of currency options and risk reversals 2 . Their results indicate that the sovereign CDS spreads covary substantially with the risk reversals. In the same spirit, Hui and Fong (2011) report similar results while focusing on the interconnectivity between the US and Japan sovereign CDS markets and the currency option market characterized by risk reversals of options on the dollar-yen exchange rate. Compared to Japan, The US sovereign credit risk is shown to have a significant impact on 1 A sovereign CDS contract provides protection against the non-payment of sovereign debt. Typically, it involves one counterparty agreeing to sell protection to another. The "protected" party pays a yearly premium known as the CDS spread in exchange for a guarantee that in the event of a default, the seller of protection will provide compensation. 2 Risk reversal is the difference in volatility (delta) between similar out-of-the-money call and put options. A positive risk reversal implies that market participants are expecting an appreciation rather than a depreciation of the local currency. The risk reversal conveys information about the skewness of the exchange rate distribution.
3 the risk reversal. Therefore it is deemed to play a more significant role in the way markets form expectations on the dollar-yen exchange rate.
Turning to the European context, Hui and Chung (2011) document information transmission from the sovereign CDS market to the currency option market. Using implied volatilities of options on the dollar-euro exchange rate as a measure of crash risk, they conclude that the credit risk of the Eurozone is a distinct factor which determines the prices of the out-of-the-money euro put options prices. The recent Eurozone crisis is viewed from various angles by the literature.
Azerti et al. (2011) and Alfonso et al. (2011) use the perspective of credit rating agencies and
show that sovereign rating announcements have spillovers effect on the European financial markets. They firstly study the response of sovereign CDS spread, banking stock index, insurance stock index and country stock while they secondly focus on the response of government yield spreads. Either way news about downgrades is found to have significant spillover effects. However, the linkages with currency option markets are not considered.
Another perspective is that of Calice et al. (2011) who analyse the Eurozone crisis by modelling liquidity in the sovereign CDS markets. They find evidence that the liquidity of CDS markets of struggling countries such as Greece, Portugal and Ireland has a substantial impact on sovereign debt spreads. An earlier strand of literature tackles the question of currency crash risk from a macro-economic angle and explains currency crash risk by economic fundamentals. It provides empirical evidence from developing countries of a relationship between macro-economic indicators and weak currencies. Countries with weak fundamentals are less likely to be able to defend their currencies against speculative attacks (Wolff (1987) , Eichengreen et al. (1996) ; Frankel and Rose (1996) ; Kaminsky et al. (2003) are a few examples).
Our study also relates to a recent strand of literature which attempts to link currency crash risk to the distribution of exchange rate. Notwithstanding the sound models and explanations established by this strand, it does not take into account sovereign credit risk. Brunnermeier et al.
(2009) detect negative skewness in the movements of exchange rates involving a low-level interest rate currency and a high-level one. This boils down to saying that carry trade strategies are exposed to crash risk. The authors argue that the skewness is triggered when such strategies take place in an abrupt manner reflecting lower risk appetite and higher liquidity constraints.
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Currency risk with respect to Carry trade strategies are also examined in work by Fahri et al. (2009) .The main risk of these strategies emerges from the value of the exchange rate at the end.
The authors propose an exchange model to distinguish between "disaster" and "Gaussian" premia in the currency option markets. The model entails a strong relationship between interest rates, changes in exchange rates and levels of risk reversals. The main empirical implication indicates that disaster premium explains 25% of carry trades returns. In others words, crash risk drives currency returns considerably. Other papers, which find a similar result by analyzing crash risk from the perspective of currency options include the work of Jurek (2009) and Burnside et al. (2011) .
Moreover, our study is related to the literature examining the linkage between corporate CDS and stock option markets and the information transmission inherent to these markets. Examples include work by Acharya and Johnson (2007) , which presents empirical evidence on the existence of information transmission from the corporate CDS to the stock market. This phenomenon is detected for firms which were subject or are likely to be subject to negative credit news and which maintain strong ties with banks. The analysis of the relation between CDS spreads and implied-volatilities in the work of Cao et al. (2010) shows that the information embedded in the implied volatilities of deep out of the money put options is able to explain the variations in CDS spreads. The skew of the implied volatilities is also computed so as to examine its effect on CDS spreads. Important to note is the fact that this implied volatility is related to the negative tail of the risk neutral probability. Besides, the information embedded in it reflects both future volatility and risk premium.
In an effort to shed more light on the current sovereign debt crisis, our study proposes the use of a sound and state-to-the art measure to assess the stability of the Euro. Based on the framework of Bakshi et al. (2003) , the stability of the euro is examined by decomposing dollar-euro 3 exchange rate options into the moments of the risk-neutral distribution. The method is partly used in the recent empirical option pricing literature (see e.g. Bams et al. (2009) and Neumann and Skiadopoulos (2012) ). In particular, we compute model-free risk-neutral volatility, skewness and kurtosis measures from the cross-section of currency option prices, which allow us to 3 The quotation 'dollar-euro' refers to the amount of dollars needed to obtain one unit of euro.
5 evaluate the stability of the euro. Skewness is typically interpreted as the euro crash risk, while risk-neutral kurtosis as the tail risk of the exchange rate distribution. The first measure gives an indication in which direction market participants are expecting the dollar-euro exchange rate to move. A negative skewness reflects concerns about a depreciation of the euro, which translates into the willingness of investors to pay a higher risk premium for put options relative to call options in order to obtain protection for the potential drop in value. Tail risk refers to the extreme events whose probability is low but whose impact on prices is large should they materialize. In particular, during the European sovereign debt crisis, we expect that possible concerns about the stability of the euro should be reflected in a negative skewness of the dollar-euro exchange rate options. The focus of this study is to examine the impact of the credit risk of Eurozone member countries on the stability of the Euro.
We document that changes in the creditworthiness of a member country on one day have a significant impact on the stability of the euro on the following day. On the one hand, an increase in member countries' credit risk results in an increase of the volatility of the dollar-euro exchange rate along with soaring tail risk induced through the risk-neutral kurtosis. On the other, we find that member countries' credit risk is a major determinant of the euro crash risk as measured by the risk-neutral skewness. Based on those results, we propose a new indicator for currency stability by combining the risk-neutral moments into an aggregated risk measure and show that our results are robust to this change in measure. Noticeable is the fact the creditworthiness of countries with vulnerable fiscal positions is the main, but not the only riskendangering factor of the euro-stability. While the creditworthiness of the latter countries has a significant impact on the skewness measure (i.e. crash risk) and the stability indicators, healthier countries equally drive the relationship between the creditworthiness and the volatility as well as the kurtosis (i.e. tail risk) of the risk-neutral distribution.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: The next section outlines the conceptual framework. Section 3 describes the data and presents some summary statistics. Then, the methodologies with respect to the option pricing aspects and the regression analyses are explained. Subsequently, the empirical results are outlined and discussed. The last section contains concluding remarks. 6
A Conceptual Framework
In this section, we attempt to provide a conceptual explanation for the channels through which the sovereign CDS market might impinge on the currency option market. We build on the contingent claim balance sheet framework of (Gray et al. (2007) Sovereign assets consist of foreign reserves, net fiscal assets and other public assets. The item "-guarantees" results from subtracting the guarantees to too-big-to-fail entities from both sides of the balance sheet. The value of local currency liabilities in foreign currency terms, , which comprises local-currency debt and base money, can be viewed as a call option on sovereign assets (in foreign currency terms), . The strike price for this option, , is the distress barrier for foreign currency-denominated debt, which is derived from the interest payments and promised payments on foreign currency debt up to time T in the future. Similar to the Black-ScholesMerton pricing framework for equity, this call option can be expressed as:
Where r f and r d are the foreign and local interest rates, respectively, and The local currency liabilities can be directly computed from the sovereign balance sheet data using actual exchange rates. The volatility of local currency liabilities, , is a function of the volatility of the money base and local currency debt, as well as exchange rate volatility. In case the exchange rate is floating, exchange rate volatility is the major part of uncertainty. The model can be implemented similarly to the Merton model, solving the two equations with two unknown variables. The probability of default of the sovereign is given by N(-d2). In order to find the model-implied credit spread, we first need to find the current value of the risky debt with promised payments B f . From the balance sheet of the sovereign, the value of risky debt D f can be expressed as the difference between the asset value, , and the value of the local currency liabilities Then the yield-to-maturity of the risky debt is ( ) and the model-implied "fair value" of the credit spread is equal to s = y -r f .
The sovereign CCA model provides a framework for valuing sovereign foreign-currency debt, local-currency debt, foreign currency value of base money and local-currency debt. However, the CCA model is not only useful for the valuation of the different constituents of a sovereign's capital structure, but also for the valuation of other claims such as CDS on foreign currency debt.
The book-based 'fair' estimates can be compared with market-based spreads of sovereign CDS's and relative value strategies can be employed. This makes it possible to benefit from capital 8 structure arbitrage strategies using various instruments, FX options and sovereign CDS, in particular. Similarly to the relationship between the volatility skew implied by equity options and CDS spreads, a trade strategy on the sovereign capital structure is to trade currency against the CDS. A "fair value" CDS spread can be obtained from the contingent claims model using currency market information. If currency volatility is expensive relative to observed CDS spreads, resulting in a 'fair value' CDS spread being too high compared to the observed spread, a strategy is to sell currency volatility (e.g. a straddle) and to buy protection. If volatility declines or spreads widen the strategy earns money. Another strategy, if currency volatility is cheap relative to the observed CDS spreads, the strategy is to buy currency volatility and to sell protection. If volatility increases or spreads decline the strategy earns money. Many different sovereign capital structure arbitrage trading strategies are possible using a variety of instruments, including FX spot and forwards, FX options, local-currency debt, foreign-currency debt, CDS on foreign-currency debt, and inflation or indexed debt. These strategies are reasonable because exchange rates (which affect the value of local currency liabilities) tend to co-move with the credit spreads of foreign currency debt. As a result, sovereign capital structure arbitrage also ensures that relevant information from the sovereign CDS market is transmitted into the currency options market. For example, if the sovereign CDS spread increases, the "fair value" modelimplied spreads appears to be cheap or the foreign currency appears to be undervalued, the strategy is to buy a put on the local currency and to sell protection. If the local currency subsequently depreciates the strategy earns money. In the European context, it suggests, that relevant information regarding sovereign distress risk might affect the stability of the Euro.
However, one might argue that there are several reasons why the sovereign CCA model is not applicable to European countries. First, countries have direct access to large and liquid markets to issue debt in their domestic currency and that is why European countries have only a relatively small amount of foreign currency debt. Moreover, countries from the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) have only limited control over the money supply of the European Central Bank (ECB) and, therefore, the analogy between local currency liabilities and equity is not complete.
However, countries like Greece are indebted in terms of a currency (the euro) that they cannot print on demand. This makes their local currency debt similar to foreign currency debt. Furthermore, the recent interventions of the European Central Bank give rise to the 9 perception that the member countries jointly took over some control over the money supply. As a result, debt of the member countries can be partly considered to be senior debt, equivalent to foreign currency debt, and partly to be junior debt, equivalent to local currency debt. This suggests that the CCA framework can be used as an ad-hoc model for relative value strategies like sovereign capital structure arbitrage.
Data & Summary Statistics
Data
We collect data on daily 5-year sovereign CDS spreads for 11 countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Greece, Spain, Italy, Ireland, Portugal. The source used to obtain the sovereign CDS quotes is Bloomberg's CMAT portal. In addition, we obtain a complete cross-section of daily over-the-counter dollar/euro option prices together with the underlying spot exchange rates, as well as interest rates for Europe and the US through Thomson
Reuters' Tick History system. Our data sample covers the period from September 10 th 2007 to January 31 st 2012 5 . Our data underwent a rigorous cleaning process in order to obtain the final dataset.
Currency option prices
We obtain OTC European type dollar/euro option prices quoted in implied volatilities at fixed maturities. We used the 1, 3, 6 and 9 months maturity options, because they are the most frequently traded ones. The option quotes are in terms of implied volatilities for particular put and call deltas categories, which is a common industry practice. The different delta categories cover the complete moneyness range of the currency options, e.g out-of-the-money calls and puts at 10-15-20-25-30-35-40-45-delta and at-the-money-options at 50-delta. Using the available delta-and maturity categories of all option contracts, on each day, we fit a functional form to the observed implied volatilities of the options, which allows us to obtain implied volatilities for every possible delta-maturity combination. That allows us to calculate call and put option prices through the Black-Scholes model. Thereafter, on a daily frequency, we are able to derive the moments of the risk-neutral distribution of the dollar-euro exchange rate options.
Sovereign CDS spread
The sovereign credit default swaps, expressed in basis points, are traded at various maturities of up to 30 years. We retrieve the 5-years maturity quotes for the 11 euro-area countries in the analysis since they are the most liquid. Table 1 portrays the summary statistics of individual countries' CDS spreads. We report summary statistics for the subprime crisis period and the sovereign debt crisis period separately.
Summary Statistics
In line with previous research (Hui and Chung (2011) the implied volatilities for calls and puts increase with maturity and they are on average higher during the sub-prime crisis.
[ Table 2 and 3] Figure 2 shows the dollar-euro option smile on February 14 th 2012 for maturities of up to 9
months. The graph nicely characterizes the extreme shape of the smile, which characterizes the European sovereign debt crisis period. The smirk-type shape, typically observed for equity options, refers to the negative skewness in the risk-neutral distribution of the dollar-euro exchange rate and, therefore, proxies the crash risk of the euro.
[ Figure 2] 
Methodology
It is industry practice to quote currency options in terms of implied volatilities at particular deltas. The Black-Scholes deltas of European-style call and put options are given by
where S is the dollar-euro exchange rate, K is the exercise, σ is the implied volatility of the option, r and q are the US and European risk-free interest rates corresponding to the time to maturity (T) of the option and N(.) is the cumulative normal distribution.
Estimating the implied volatility surface
For the empirical analysis, we first use a modification of the prominent ad-hoc Black-Scholes model of Dumas, Fleming and Whaley (1998) to estimate the implied volatility surface of our currency options. We use all available information content in currency option prices for different moneyness (deltas) and different maturities. The aim is to construct a time series of standardized measures (e.g. risk neutral volatility, skewness and kurtosis) that characterize the cross-section of prices and can be compared over time. Rather than averaging the two contracts that are closest to at-the-money or closest to one month maturity, we fit the modified ad-hoc Black-Scholes model to all option contracts on a given day and subsequently obtain the desired functional form of the implied volatility surface. This strategy successfully eliminates some of the noise from the data (see Christoffersen et al. (2010) ). We allow each option to have its own Black-Scholes implied volatility depending on the options delta and time to maturity T. We use the following functional form for the options implied volatility:
where IV ij denotes the observed implied volatility and delta C,i,j , the delta of a call option for the ith moneyness and j-th maturity, defined in Equation (1) 6 . T j denotes the time to maturity of an option for the j-th maturity. It is common practice to estimate the parameters using standard OLS. For every call option delta (or put option delta) and maturity, we can compute the implied volatility and derive option prices using the Black-Scholes model. For example, the implied volatility for an at-the-money short term call option with three month maturity can be derived by setting delta equal to 0.5 and time to maturity T equal to 3/12.
Calculating the moments of the risk-neutral distribution 6 For put options, we use the corresponding call delta in the implied volatility regression.
13
Having characterized the implied volatility surface of the dollar-euro exchange rate options, we calibrate the moments of the resulting risk-neutral distribution. Bakshi et al. (2003) derive a model-free measure of risk-neutral variance, skewness and kurtosis based on all options over the complete moneyness range for a particular time to maturity T.
Variance, skewness and kurtosis of the T-month risk-neutral distribution can be computed by 
The parameters correspond to the ones used in Equation (1) and (2). c and p refer to call and put prices. Again, rather than averaging the observed implied volatilities of all contracts that are closest to one particular maturity (e.g. 3 month), we derive the Bakshi et al. (2003) risk-neutral moments using the estimated implied volatility surface and the corresponding call and put prices.
In the empirical analysis, we focus on the 3 months horizon and calculate the moments of the 3-months risk-neutral distribution.
Regression analysis
The first step in our analysis is to regress daily changes in credit default spreads of country i on contemporaneous and lagged changes in the various moments that we use to characterize the risk-neutral distribution as well as on lagged changes in credit default spreads in order to extract the residual component, hence, we estimate the following equations
We do this for up to five lags to absorb any contemporaneous information transmission and any lagged information transmission. In this way, we are able to identify the information arriving in the CDS market, which is not based on information that has been revealed in the dollar-euro options market. The resulting residuals ε t can be interpreted as innovations in the CDS market relative to the risk-neutral moments that characterize the market conditions in the currency options market. Subsequently, for each country i, we run a regression of changes in the moments of the riskneutral distributions on lagged innovations in the CDS market and lagged changes in the variable itself, hence, we estimate
For each of the risk-neutral moments, we examine Figure 3 shows the annualized volatility of the daily 3-month risk-neutral distribution together with the dollar-euro exchange rate over the period from September 10 th 2007 to January 31 st 2012. Figure 4 shows the daily risk-neutral skewness and kurtosis of 3 month options calculated according to Bakshi et al. (2003) . Interestingly, during the subprime crisis, the skewness is mainly positive and turns negative during the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis, with a turning point in October 2009, typically found to be the start of the sovereign debt crisis.
Empirical results
Kurtosis was much higher and more volatile during the subprime crisis and reaches its peak in December 2008.
[ Figure 3 and 4] Clearly, our risk neutral skewness measure is able to distinguish between turbulent times. During the subprime crisis, our measure is positive reflecting a possible depreciation (crash risk) of the Dollar. Towards mid-October 2009, the skewness measure turns negative, suggesting a change in the market expectations of the euro vis-à-vis the dollar. That is, markets expect the euro to depreciate, which translates into buying put options of the dollar-euro exchange rate. The lower kurtosis exhibited during the sovereign debt crisis is synonymous to "thinner" tails of the risk-neutral distribution of the dollar-euro exchange rate. Therefore, the tail risk of the two currencies seems to be priced in the US. The subprime crisis starting with the burst of the housing bubble in the US had a major impact on the US economy. Figure 2 shows that during the subprime crisis, not only the volatility of the dollar-euro exchange rate substantially increased, but the kurtosis of the risk-neutral distribution, our proxy for tail risk, increased as well. However, during the sovereign debt crisis period the volatility increased, but the tail risk of the two currencies is relatively stable at a low level.
[ Table 4 ]
Summary statistics of the dollar-euro exchange rate and the risk-neutral moments are displayed in Table 4 . The skewness measure is positive over the sub-prime crisis (0.47) but becomes negative during the sovereign debt crisis (-0.37) reflecting concerns of market participants about the stability of the euro. With respect to the kurtosis measure, the lower kurtosis exhibited during the sovereign debt crisis (5 versus 8 in the prior period) is synonymous to "thinner" tails of the risk-neutral distribution of the dollar-euro exchange rate and, therefore, lower tail risk. Table 5 summaries our regression analysis results. The reported betas refer to the sum of regression coefficients based on equations (7a) -(7c) and can be interpreted as a measures of impact of countries' i credit risk on the risk-neutral moments of the dollar-euro exchange rate and, therefore, on the stability of the euro. For the complete sample period, the results suggest that member countries creditworthiness affects the volatility of the dollar-euro exchange rate. An increase in the CDS spreads, indicating worsening credit conditions, has a positive impact on the volatility of the exchange rate. However, the results for skewness and kurtosis are typically insignificant. Once we separate the period into a subprime crisis period and a sovereign debt crisis period, we observe significant differences over time. Looking at the subprime crisis period, our estimates have no statistical significance. The interpretation is that the credit risk of the euroarea member countries as measured by their CDS spreads does not affect the stability of the euro induced through the skewness (Skew) and kurtosis (Kurt) of the risk-neutral distribution of the dollar-euro exchange rate together with the risk-neutral volatility. In contrast, the results during the sovereign debt crisis period are quite pronounced. An increase in member countries' credit risk results in an increased risk-neutral volatility of the dollar-euro exchange rate along with soaring tail risk induced through the risk-neutral kurtosis. Furthermore, the impact for healthy countries is significantly not different to the impact for vulnerable countries. As result, both vulnerable and healthy countries have an impact on the stability of the euro in the way that higher levels of volatility are accompanied by lower levels of the exchange rate, and in turn, a weaker euro.
However, we find that member countries' credit risk is a major determinant of the euro crash risk as measured by the risk-neutral skewness. Overall, the relationship is negative, suggesting that an increase in countries' credit risk has a negative impact on the stability of the euro.
[ Table 5 ]
With respect to the skewness measure, we find statistical significance only among countries belonging to the "vulnerable" group, namely: Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Italy. These (1895)), which can be used to model a wide scale of distributions with various skewness and kurtosis. The Pearson System is a family of probability density distributions which includes a unique distribution corresponding to every valid combination of the moments of a distribution. It is possible to find the distribution in the Pearson system that precisely matches the moments of the risk-neutral distribution and to generate a random sample. We calculate the VaR and ES for both lower tail and upper tail at the 1%-quantile from the generated random samples.
We construct two euro stability indicators by relating the upper tail of the risk-neutral distribution to the lower tail, e.g. the absolute VaR of the upper 1%-quantile divided by the absolute VaR of the lower 1%-quantile. Clearly, these indicators nicely summarize the imbalances of extreme values of the risk-neutral distribution overall and can be considered to reflect currency stability. For example, a ratio below one indicates a fatter left tail of the distribution compared to the right tail and, therefore, suggests euro instability. Figure 5 shows the stability indicators for the complete period.
[ Figure 5 ]
We replicate the 2-step regression analysis outlined in Equations (6) and (7) by replacing e.g. the skewness measure by the different stability indicators. The resulting betas are shown in Table 6 .
VaR ratio refers to the indicator based on the Value-at-Risks measure and ES ratio refers to the indicator based on the expected shortfall measure.
[ Table 6 ]
The results suggest that our previous findings are robust to a change of measure for euro stability. Most of the coefficients are insignificant except the ones for the sovereign debt crisis sub sample. During that period, all coefficients are substantially negative, which entails that member countries credit risk have a negative impact on the stability of the euro. But again, during the sovereign debt crisis period the struggling countries drive the instability of the common currency. It can be shown that the betas for the healthy countries and the ones of the vulnerable countries are significantly different form each other at the 5% level for both indicators. The principal component analysis again supports those conjectures. In line with previous findings and contrary to what one would expect, the creditworthiness of Greece does not seem to affect the stability of the common currency significantly.
Conclusions
In this paper, the recent Eurozone sovereign debt crisis is viewed through the twin lenses of sovereign credit swaps and currency option markets. We empirically investigate the impact of the credit risk of Eurozone member countries on the stability of the Euro. The credit risk of a country can be measured through its sovereign credit default swap (CDS). Market prices of CDS spreads reflect the perception of financial markets about the economic-political stability of a country, and thus about the creditworthiness of a given sovereign. The stability of the euro is examined by decomposing dollar-euro exchange rate options into the moments of the risk-neutral distribution. We document that changes in the creditworthiness of a member country on one day have a significant impact on the stability of the euro on the following day. On the one hand, an increase in member countries' credit risk results in an increase of the volatility of the dollar-euro exchange rate along with soaring tail risk induced through the risk-neutral kurtosis. On the other hand, we find that member countries' credit risk is a major determinant of the euro crash risk as measured by the risk-neutral skewness. We propose a new indicator for currency stability by combining the risk-neutral moments into an aggregated risk measure and show that our results are robust to this change in measure. In line with previous research, these findings apply to the period of the sovereign debt crisis but not necessarily to the subprime crisis period. Noticeable is the fact the creditworthiness of countries with vulnerable fiscal positions is the main, but not the only risk-endangering factor of the euro-stability. While the creditworthiness of the latter countries has a significant impact on the skewness measure (i.e crash risk) and the stability indicators, healthier countries equally drive the relationship between the creditworthiness and the kurtosis (i.e tail risk). As one would expect, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy play a prominent role. However, this does not seem to be the case for Greece, which can be partly explained by the only marginal foreign exposure of European banks to Greece. VaR ratio ES ratio Note: For each country, the dependent variables are the Value-at-Risk ratios and Expected Shortfall ratios of the daily moments of the 3-months risk-neutral distribution of dollar-euro exchange rate options (the variance is expressed in terms of annualized volatility). T-stats are computed based on the Wald test. . (***) indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level, (**) at the 5 percent level and (*) at the 10 percent level.
